State v. Joshua Morris, Tenn. Crim. App., 2026 WL 243358, filed January 28, 2026, in Knoxville.

Morris was arrested on January 14, 2022, for DUI when he was allegedly found inside a parked car in Knox County.  He was also charged with the violation of the implied consent statute.

A preliminary hearing was held on August 18, 2022, in General Sessions Court on the DUI charge which resulted in the case being bound over for consideration by the Grand Jury.  In a simultaneous hearing, the General Sessions Judge found that Morris had violated the implied consent law by initially refusing a blood test – a civil law (non-criminal) determination.

The defendant timely appealed the finding of the General Sessions Judge on the implied consent violation to the Knox County Circuit Court, where civil matters are heard.  This appeal was perfected before any further action occurred in the DUI case.

Morris was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for DUI on March 28, 2023.  Of course, this case was pending in the Criminal Court, not Circuit Court where the implied consent appeal was lodged.

In the implied consent case, pending in Circuit Court, Morris moved for summary judgment on the basis that he had been illegally arrested and detained.  He claimed that there was no probable cause to believe that he had been operating the vehicle and thusly an element of the offense of DUI was lacking.  A hearing was conducted.  The Circuit Court granted, on July 11, 2024, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment “on the basis that there was no evidence to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence”.  (Opinion P. 4).  The State did not appeal.

Thereafter, Morris filed a motion to dismiss the DUI indictment in the Criminal Court on the basis that the State was “collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of probable cause as it has been previously litigated and determined in a prior decision between the parties.”  (Opinion P. 5).  The Criminal Court held a hearing which resulted in it agreeing with Morris and dismissing the DUI charge in an order of December 11, “2014”, (sic. 2024). (Opinion P. 5).  The State appealed the dismissal to the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The intermediate appellate court conducted a thorough analysis in an opinion authored by Judge Matthew Wilson.  First, the court noted that the question of collateral estoppel is one of law and is reviewed de novo on appeal.  Next, the court examined the development of the common law doctrine(s) of collateral estoppel, noting that collateral estoppel is recognized in criminal cases both under federal and Tennessee law, for use by a defendant in support of a defensive claim of double jeopardy.  Thirdly, the court analyzed the specific application of collateral estoppel to a criminal case based upon an earlier decision in a civil implied consent proceeding.  This question is reportedly one of first impression in Tennessee.

The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that collateral estoppel did not prohibit a DUI prosecution where there had been a final decision of no probable cause for the arrest in a related civil implied consent action.  The stated rationale for this decision by the intermediate court is that:

• the Grand Jury action in finding that probable cause did exist cannot be reviewed collaterally; and,
• even if the DUI arrest lacked probable cause, the result would not be the dismissal of the indictment but rather the suppression of the evidence flowing from the arrest – which in this case may be none; and,
• in a catch-all reason, that the State did not have the “full and fair opportunity to litigate in the Circuit court the constitutional validity of the officer’s warrantless arrest” (although it seems that the Defendant complied with the applicable rules).

In summary, the Court of Criminal Appeals implied that this is an interesting argument which Morris advances, but it was unconvinced.  The intermediate court reversed the dismissal of the indictment and remanded.  (As of this writing, the author is unaware of an application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.)